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Abstract. We propose two stream ciphers based on a non-secure pseudoran-
dom number generator (called the mother generator). The mother generator
is here chosen to be the Mersenne Twister (MT), a widely used 32-bit integer
generator having 19937 bits of internal state and period 219937 − 1.
One proposal is CryptMT, which computes the accumulative product of
the output of MT, and use the most signiﬁcant 8 bits as a secure random
numbers. Its period is proved to be 219937 − 1, and it is 1.5-2.0 times faster
than the most optimized AES in counter-mode.
The other proposal, named Fubuki, is designed to be usable also as a block
cipher. It prepares nine diﬀerent kinds of encryption functions (bijections
from blocks to blocks), each of which takes a parameter. Fubuki encrypts a
sequence of blocks (= a plain message) by applying these encryption functions
iteratedly to each of the blocks. Both the combination of the functions and
their parameters are pseudorandomly chosen by using its mother generator
MT. The key and the initial value are passed to the initialization scheme of
MT.
1. Introduction
In this paper, we consider cryptographic systems implemented in software. We
assume a 32-bit CPU machine with fast multiplication of words, and a moderate
size of working area (about 4K bytes).
In a narrow sense, a stream cipher system is to generate cryptographically secure
pseudorandom numbers (PN) from a shared key, and take exclusive-or with the
plain message to obtain ciphered message. One way to generate such PN is to use
a non-secure generator like LFSR (which we call the mother generator), initialize it
by using the key, and then ﬁlter its outputs, i.e., apply some complicated functions
to obtain a secure sequence.
Along this line, we propose to use a GF(2)-linear generator whose internal state
consists of 19937 bits, Mersenne Twister (MT) (see §3 for the detail). MT is
invented by two of the authors [4]. It has period 219937 − 1 and uniform equidis-
tribution property upto 623 dimension. Its initialization scheme is improved to
accept an array of any length as an initial seed in 2002. MT is widely accepted in
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Figure 1. CryptMT: period 219937 − 1, and twice faster than the
optimized AES (Pentium-M, gcc -O3)
the society of MonteCarlo simulations, and implementations in C and many other
languages are available from the homepage [5].
As described in this homepage, a way to generate a cryptographically secure PN
sequence is to use MT, and compress its outputs by using, say, MD5 or SHA1.
2. CryptMT
The ﬁrst proposal in this paper is even simpler. MT generates a sequence of
unsigned 32 bit integers (which from now on we shall call words). The given key
and initial value are concatenated and passed to the initialization scheme (§3) of
MT. We prepare a variable accum of word size, which is set to 1 at the beginning
(this may be any odd integer).
Then, we iterate the following process to obtain (probably) a cryptographically
secure PN sequence of 8-bit integers (= byte):
(1) Generate one pseudorandom word gen rand by MT.
(2) Multiply it to accum:
accum← accum× (gen rand | 1).
(3) Output the most signiﬁcant 8 bits of accum. Go to Step 1.
To raise the security, the ﬁrst 64 bytes of the outputs are discarded.
Here the C-language-like notation “|” denotes bitwise-OR operation. This op-
eration is to make the multiplier odd (otherwise, after several iterations, accum
would be zero). Multiplication is considered modulo 232.
This method generates a PN sequence of bytes, which ﬁts to the usual require-
ments for a stream cipher. We call this stream cipher CryptMT, meaning Crypto-
graphic Mersenne Twister.
Our experiment shows that CryptMT is faster by a factor of 1.5–2.0 than the well-
optimized counter-mode AES (see §6.1), widely known as rijndael-alg-fst.c.
The size of the internal state of MT seems to be enough to make any kind of
time-memory-trade-oﬀ attacks infeasible.
If all bits of accum were used (diﬀerently from the 8 bits as in CryptMT) then
the sequence would not be cryptographically secure, since from the change of the
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accum we could recover the output of MT (except for the least signiﬁcant bit), then
by linear algebra one can decide the internal state after observing 19937 bits of
the output. However, if only the most signiﬁcant 8 bits after multiplication are
observed, then we can not imagine how to obtain the internal state of MT.
It is important to use the most signiﬁcant bits: the least signiﬁcant bit is always
1, and the second bit of accum coincides with the summation (modulo 2) of the
second bit of the outputs of MT so far, from which one could compute MT’s internal
state. The most signiﬁcant bits seem to be safe, since the bit-diﬀusion pattern of
the multiplication is from right to left, and most signiﬁcant bits gather information
of all the less signiﬁcant bits of the two operands: accum and the output of MT.
The above gave a complete description of CryptMT, except for the description
of the mother generator MT (§3). Security of CryptMT is largely depending on the
mother generator MT and its initialization. The facts that (1) the size of internal
state of MT is huge, (2) 3/4 of the output bits of MT are discarded, (3) MSBs
after multiplication gather information of all bits, and (4) initialization is highly
nonlinear, seem to imply high security, but we need more detailed study. The
period of each of 8 bits of the output of CryptMT is 219937 − 1 (see Appendix A).
Design rationales of CryptMT are
(1) use a fast linear generator, which has a huge state (e.g. thousands of bits),
and
(2) ﬁlter its output by a ﬁnite state non-linear automaton which has a relatively
small state (e.g. one word),
(3) Only a small fraction of the information of the state is output (e.g. 8 bits
among 32 bits).
as seen in Figure 1. The former ensures the long period, and the latter ensures
complicated bit-diﬀusion, under a compromise with the speed in software imple-
mentation.
3. Mersenne Twister
MT generates a PN word sequence by the GF(2)-linear recursion
w624+i = w397+i ⊕ ((wi&0x80000000)|(w1+i&0x7fffffff))A (i = 0, 1, 2, . . .).
Here wi (i = 0, 1, 2, . . .) are 32-bit integers, each of which is considered as a 32-
dimensional row vector over the two element ﬁeld GF(2). The binary operator ⊕
denotes bitwise exclusive-or, i.e., addition as a vector.
The C-like hexadecimal notation 0x80000000 denotes the vector whose compo-
nents are all zero except for the left most 1. Thus, ((wi&0x80000000)|(w1+i&0x7fffffff))
is the row vector obtained by concatenating the MSB of wi and all bits but the
MSB of w1+i. To this vector a constant 32 × 32 matrix A is multiplied from the
right. This matrix A is of the form
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
1
. . .
1
a31 a30 · · · · · · a0
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
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and so the multiplication is computed by
xA =
{
shiftright(x) (if the LSB of x is 0)
shiftright(x)⊕ a (if the LSB of x is 1),
where a is a constant vector
a = (a31, a30, . . . , a0) = 0x9908B0DF in the hexadecimal notation.
These constants are chosen so that the period of the sequence is 219937 − 1. The
number of nonzero terms in the characteristic polynomial of the state transition
function is 153.
Figure 2 illustrates the state transition of MT. The state consists of 623 words
+ 1 bit. The next state is obtained by shifting one words to the above, and insert
a new word linearly computed from the discarded part and a middle term. In a
software implementation, instead of shifting, we use round robin technique (i.e. to
use a pointer) for the eﬃciency of the generation.
Advantages of this conﬁguration over usual LFSR with coeﬃcients, say, in GF(232),
are (1) No need of costive operations like “multiplication modulo polynomials,” (2)
There is a fast algorithm to check the maximality of the period by paring and
Galois theory [4], (3) The generation speed is independent of a, which makes the
parameter-search easier. This is diﬀerent from LFSR, where the generation speed
depends on a particular choice of the coeﬃcients.
Remark 3.1. In the original MT, the output is transformed by a linear trans-
formation to attain nearly optimally high-dimensional equidistribution at MSBs.
This is called Tempering. We removed this transformation, since we think it non-
necessary because of the application of complicated functions to the outputs of MT
in the encryption process.
For initialization, we need to specify w0, w1, . . . , w623 as the initial state (to be
precise, all the 31 bits of w0 but the most signiﬁcant bit are neglected in generating
the next word, so the state space has 624 × 32 − 31 = 19937 bits). The output
sequence of MT is w624, w625, . . ., i.e., MT skips the contents of the initial state.
The initialization is particularly important for MT. Because of the linearity and
the sparseness of the recursion of MT, if the initial state has too many zeroes, then
the output sequence has same tendency for more than 10000 outputs. The 2002
version of MT [5] has an initialization function init by array(u32 init key[],
int key length), whose ﬁrst argument is an array of 32-bit words with length
given by the second argument, which is described as follows.
First, w0, . . . , w623 are set to a ﬁxed nontrivial value by a recursion
(1)
w0 ← 19650218,
wi ← ((wi−1 ⊕ (wi−1 >> 30)) + i)× 1812433253
(1 ≤ i ≤ 623), where wi are considered as 32-bit unsigned integer variables, and
every arithmetic operation is modulo 232. The notation >> 30 means the shift to
the right by 30 bits. (The constant 19650218 is the birthday of one of the authors,
chosen without reason. The other constant 1812433253 is a multiplier for a linear
congruential generator [3, P.106], here chosen without reason.)
This recursion is chosen to have a good bit-diﬀusion property. The multiplication
with constant has a good bit-mixing property, except for that the diﬀusion of the
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Figure 2. State transition of Mersenne Twister
bit information is always from right to left. The most signiﬁcant two bits (which
gather the information of all bits after multiplication) are sent to the least signiﬁcant
two bits of wi by exclusive-or, to complement the multiplication. The assignment
wi−1 → wi is bijective.
Addition with i is to avoid the following phenomenon. Suppose that i is not
added in the recursion (1). Suppose that an initial value w0 is chosen (although it
is ﬁxed to 19650218 in the above implementation) and let w0, w1, . . . , w623 be the
generated sequence. Suppose that in another initialization another initial value w′0
is chosen, which generates a sequence w′0, w
′
1, . . . , w
′
623. What we worry is that it
may happen that w′0 = w1 by accident (or w
′
0 = w2, or alike), and then, w
′
i = wi+1
for i = 0, 1, . . . , 622. Such similarity of the initial states yields correlated outputs
for 10000 outputs or so according to the experiments. The addition with i avoids
these phenomena.
The initial seed is given as an array init key[length] of an arbitrary length
length upto 64. The initialization scheme init by array rewrites the above
w1, . . . , w623 by the following recursive substitution:
(2)
wi ← (wi ⊕ (((wi−1 ⊕ (wi−1 >> 30))× 1664525))
+init key[i mod length] + (i mod length)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , 623. Note that every multiplication or addition is done modulo
232. This recursion is chosen in the same spirit as (1), with adding init key[]
meanwhile. The reason why taking “i modulo length” at the last of the recur-
sion is as follows. Suppose that we don’t take modulo length. Suppose that one
initialization is given by an array init key[], and another initialization is given
another array of the twice length with the content being the two repetitions of the
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original array. Then the two initializations yield the same state. Such phenomenon
is avoided by taking modulo length.
Then, we substitute the ﬁrst word
w0 ← w623,
and again apply a similar recursive substitution
(3) wi ← (wi ⊕ (((wi−1 ⊕ (wi−1 >> 30))× 1566083941))− i
for i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , 623.
Finally, the most signiﬁcant bit of w0 is set to one, to avoid the zero initial state.
According to the experiments, this initialization has a good bit-distribution prop-
erty. Any one bit of the change in the initial seed array init key[] dramatically
changes the initial state. The worst related keys seem to be those having diﬀerence
only at the last word of init key[]. However, the output of MT starts from w624,
which depends on w397, which seem to be diﬃcult to control because of at least
397 − (64 + 64) times application of (2) at the last word of init key[]. (This
64 + 64 is because the size of the key and the size of the initial value are upto 64
words). In addition, each word of the internal state is transformed by the nonlinear
bit-mixing recurrence (3) on the key. It seems very diﬃcult to utilize the technique
of diﬀerential cryptanalysis with respect to the key.
Remark 3.2. The above initialization scheme was incorporated in 2002, and it
actually admits an array of arbitrary length as the initial seeding vector [5]. This
feature is to answer to the requests of ﬁnancial engineers, who want to use the ascii
code of the name of each companies in the stock markets, as the initial-seed array.
This initialization is not designed for cryptographic purpose, but it seems to have
enough resistance, so we keep it as is. However, from the viewpoint of eﬃciency,
this is redundant. A quicker initialization is possible. For example, we do not need
the ﬁrst round (setting constants to the state array) in the initialization.
4. Fubuki
The other proposal in this paper is Fubuki cipher system. The basic idea is:
“software is soft, so we can make the choice of encryption functions as ﬂexible as
possible.” This may be contrasted to Rijndael block cipher, where in each round the
encryption function is ﬁxed: just the key (to be exor-ed) is changed. The proposal
of Fubuki is to change the parameters of each functions.
To ﬁx the situation, we assume that a block consists of 4 words (i.e. 4 of 32-bit
integers), but the reference implementation of Fubuki allows 4, 8 or 16 words as
one block. We use the notations
W := the set of 32 bit words, B := W 4 = the set of blocks.
A plain message is a ﬁnite sequence of blocks, i.e. an element of BL, where L ∈ N
is the length of the message.
This paper considers a stream cipher in a more general sense than taking exclusive-
or with PN. Let K be the key space. In a typical case,
K = W 4 = the set of 128 bits.
Deﬁnition 4.1. A stream cipher is a sequence of functions called encoding func-
tions
Ei : B → B, i = 1, 2, . . . ,
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and another sequence of functions called decoding functions
Di : B → B, i = 1, 2, . . .
such that Di ◦ Ei = id (the identity function).
A plain message B1, B2, . . . is encoded into E1(B1), E2(B2), . . ., and then decoded
by D1(E1(B1)),D2(E2(B2)), . . .. Each of Ei,Di depends on both the key K and i.
Remark 4.2. If Ei and Di are identical for any i, then the system is called a block
cipher.
Remark 4.3. A stream cipher in Deﬁnition 4.1 can be used to generate a (possibly
cryptographically secure) PN, by merely encoding a message consisting of, say, all
zero.
The basic strategy of Fubuki is to compose several simple encryption functions,
i.e., Shannon’s “product” in his 1949 paper.
We use the following deﬁnition, which is nothing but a usual block cipher system
(if we consider the parameter set as the set of keys).
Deﬁnition 4.4. A primitive encryption family PF with a parameter set P is a
mapping
PF : P × B → B
with its inverse family PF ′
PF ′ : P × B → B
such that for all P ∈ P and B ∈ B
PF ′(P, (PF (P,B))) = B
holds.
The size of P may vary among diﬀerent PEFs.
Let us denote by
PF (P,−) : B → B, B → PF (P,B)
the bijection associated to the PF with parameter P .
Fubuki prepares nine diﬀerent primitive encryption families. Four of them are
designed to diﬀuse the bit-information mainly inside each word in the block (word-
wise PEF), four of them are designed to mix the information of words (inter-word
PEF), and the last one is designed to cut oﬀ the incidence relation of bits in each
word (vertical rotate, denoted by PFv-rot).
The given key and the given initial value are passed to the initialization of
the mother generator MT. Using the non-secure PN sequence generated by MT,
Fubuki pseudorandomly selects one of the four wordwise PEFs, say PFword1 , and
its parameter Pword1 , and apply PF
word
1 (P
word
1 ,−) to B1. Then similarly select
one of the four inter-word PEFs, say PF inter1 , and its parameter P
inter
1 , and apply
it to the result. Then apply PFv-rot with pseudorandomly selected parameter
Pv-rot1 .
This is one round of Fubuki encryption, and it is repeated several times. The
choice in the reference code is four times iteration for each block. Thus, the block
Bi is encoded by applying
Ei := Round4,i ◦ Round3,i ◦ Round2,i ◦ Round1,i
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where each round is given by
Roundj,i =
PFv-rot(Pv-rotj,i ,−) ◦ PF interj,i (P interj,i ,−) ◦ PFwordj,i (Pwordj,i ,−) (j = 1, 2, 3, 4),
where PEFs and their parameters are pseudorandomly chosen by MT. (The PF interj,i
is uniformly pseudorandomly chosen from four inter-word PEFs and its parameter
is uniformly chosen from its parameter space. Similarly for PFwordj,i .)
The decoding function Di is its inverse, given by
Ei := Round′1,i ◦ Round′2,i ◦ Round′3,i ◦ Round′4,i
where each round is given by
Round′j,i =
PFwordj,i
′
(Pwordj,i ,−) ◦ PF interj,i
′
(P interj,i ,−) ◦ PFv-rot
′
(Pv-rotj,i ,−) (j = 1, 2, 3, 4),
where ′ denotes inverse PEFs.
The design rationale of Fubuki is as follows.
(1) An idea is to choose simplest operations (i.e. those in the instruction set of
typical CPU, such as exor or multiplication) as the building blocks of PEF.
Any complicated operation is made from simple operations, so freely
composing simple ones seems better than ﬁxing one way.
(2) However, if it is too free, then (with very small probability) it may happen
that one same PEF is selected all the time. So, there should be a trade-oﬀ
between freedom to choose a combination of PEFs and restriction to assure
good bit-information diﬀusion.
Fubuki did this by making each PEF a combination of a few simple
operations.
(3) Fubuki has no S-boxes. In some sense, the integer multiplication replaces
the S-boxes. The integer multiplication has a good and fast bit-diﬀusion
property. It has two weakness: (1) the bit-diﬀusion is only from the right
bits to the left ones, (2) it is (bi)-linear, so diﬀerential cryptanalysis is
valid. However, Fubuki compensates these by (1) suitable bit-operations
with left-to-right diﬀusion property and (2) combining exclusive-or to make
it non-linear.
A recent study warns that any cryptographic system in a fast implemen-
tation using a large lookup table for S-box is vulnerable by cache-timing
attack [6] [2]. This method breaks AES. (Fubuki has two tables of 32 words,
which may leak some information. We need further study).
(4) Fubuki consumes far (e.g. 13 times) more PNs (from its mother generator)
than the size of the plain message: since the parameter space of each PEF is
large (actually we arranged the size to be nearly the same with one block),
every round consumes three times block-size of PNs.
This redundancy makes it diﬃcult to guess the internal state of the
mother generator, even by chosen-plain text attack with chosen initial val-
ues.
Actually, Fubuki has an aspect of block cipher. Suppose that the key and the
initial value are ﬁxed, and these are repeatedly used in a stream cipher for diﬀerent
texts (which is prohibited usually for stream cipher; it is the context for block
ciphers). Then, a stream cipher in a narrower sense (i.e. exor with PN) is easily
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broken by known-plain text attack, since the PN sequence is recovered by taking
exor. In a block cipher, it is required that Ei (and Di) are diﬃcult to guess from an
(even huge) number of pairs (B,Ei(B)) where B can be chosen (i.e. chosen plain
text attack). Fubuki is designed to have this type of resistance.
5. Description of Fubuki
5.1. Overview. Fubuki prepares four wordwize PEFs
empr, emer, emps, emes
and four inter-word PEFs
ma, mem, ome, eme
and one PEF vert rotate.
One round of Fubuki consists of three stages: choose one of the four wordwise
PEFs and apply it to the plain block, then choose one of the four inter-word PEFs,
then apply vert rotate. In C-like notation, it is described as
c = pseudorandom_two_bits();
switch (c) {
case 0: crypt_empr(msgbuf); break;
case 1: crypt_emer(msgbuf); break;
case 2: crypt_emps(msgbuf); break;
case 3: crypt_emes(msgbuf); break;
}
c = pseudorandom_two_bits();
switch (c) {
case 0: crypt_ma(msgbuf); break;
case 1: crypt_mem(msgbuf); break;
case 2: crypt_ome(msgbuf); break;
case 3: crypt_eme(msgbuf); break;
}
crypt_vert_rotate(msgbuf);
Here, msgbuf is an array of block size, and each PEF rewrites this array. The
parameters are generated in each of PEF by calling MT, so not visible in this
description. This round is iterated for Iteration times (which is 4 in default case,
for 128 bit blocks).
The two-bits pseudorandom integers are generated as follows. We use C-language-
like notation.
genrand_tuple_int32(func_choice, 4);
func_choice[2] *= (func_choice[0] | 1);
func_choice[3] *= (func_choice[1] | 1);
func_choice[0] ^= (func_choice[3] >> 5);
func_choice[1] ^= (func_choice[2] >> 5);
Here, the ﬁrst function ﬁlls four PNs into the array func choice. The next four
transformations mix these four words. The notation *= is to multiply the right
hand side to the left and write to the left, ^= is similar operation with exclusive-or,
| is bitwise OR operation, >> 5 is bit-shift-to-right by 5 bits.
Fubuki uses the 128 bits in this array for function choice: ﬁrst use the most
signiﬁcant two bits of func choice[0], then next two bits of func choice[0], and
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so on. Thus, if Iteration=4, then most signiﬁcant 16 bits of func choice[0] are
used to choose PEFs 2× 4 times.
5.2. Primitive encryption families. To make the explanation and the imple-
mentation simpler, we choose one uniform parameter space P for all PEFs. Let t
be the number of words in the block (typically four, and assumed to be a power of
2). Then, B := W t, and we set
P := W t × {1, 2, . . . , t− 1}.
We denote an element of P ∈ P and B ∈ B by
P = (p0, p1, . . . , pt−1, jump), B = (b0, b1, . . . , bt−1).
Each of bi is considered as a variable of wordsize.
5.3. Wordwise PEFs. Each of wordwise PEFs is described as follows. Again, t
is the number of the words in a block.
The block B is transformed as follows. Let j = 0. The ﬁrst operation is
bj ← bj ⊕ pj .
Note that its inverse is itself.
Then, multiply a constant
bj ← bj × cj mod 232.
The constant cj should be (multiplicatively) invertible modulo 232, i.e., should be
odd. Their inverses are necessary in decoding, and would be time-consuming if
they were computed during the decoding process. So, before starting encryption,
Fubuki prepares 32 pseudo-randomly chosen 32-bit integers m0,m1, . . . ,m31, using
MT, and store them in an array mult table. Before decoding, Fubuki computes
their inverses m′0,m
′
1, . . . ,m
′
31, and store them in an array inv table.
These multipliers mk (k = 0, . . . , 31) are the ﬁrst 32 outputs of the initialized
MT, but by bit-operations we set the least signiﬁcant four bits of mk to 1011 for
k even, and to 0111 for k odd. Moreover, the ((k mod 8) + 1)-st bit and ((k
mod 8) + 2)-nd bit of mk are set to 1 and 0, respectively. This is to avoid too
trivial multipliers like 1 or 232 − 1.
The constant cj is chosen from these multipliers by putting
cj := mkj , kj = (pj+ mod t >> (32− 5)).
Here,  is a constant and >> (32 − 5) means right-shift by 32 − 5 bits. For empr,
emer, emps, emes, the constant  is 1, 2, 2, 3, respectively.
Such a multiplication diﬀuses information of bits in bj from right to left. To force
the diﬀusion in the inverse direction, Fubuki prepares 32 pseudorandomly chosen
32-bit constants a0, a1, . . . , a31 using MT, stored in an array add table of 32 words.
This array is ﬁlled with the next 32 outputs of MT after setting mk’s. To avoid
trivial constants, apply the following operation:
for (i=0; i< 32; i++) {
u32 s;
s = (i * 1103515245 + 12345) & 31;
s ^= (s >> 2);
add_table[i] <<= 5;
add_table[i] |= s;
}
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That is, the content of add table[i] is shifted to left by ﬁve bits (the notation <<=
5), and the least ﬁve bits are set to be si which is given by
si ← (1103515245i + 12345) mod 32,
si ← si ⊕ (si >> 2),
for i = 0, . . . , 31. (The notation & denotes bitwise-AND, so & 31 is taking modulo
32.) This is just to make the correspondence i → si a complicated permutation on
{0, 1, . . . , 31}. Then, apply the operation
(4) b(j+jump) mod t ← b(j+jump) mod t  (add table[bj >> (32− 5)]),
where  is plus (modulo 232) for empr and emps, and exclusive-or for emer and
emes. Here, jump is a component of the parameter. Each PEF is designed to
rewrite bj depending on the information in bj−jump mod t.
The parameter jump is not randomly chosen: jump is set to 1 before encoding
each block, and after executing each PEF, it is rewritten by
jump← jump× 2;
if jump ≥ t then jump← 1.
Thus, jump moves 1, 2, 4, 8,. . . , and if it becomes more than or equal to t, it is
set to 1. This is to scatter the information of one word to the other words in the
block as quick as possible. Partial sum of 1, 2, 4,. . . represents any integer, so after
log2(t) times iteration of PEFs, the information of one word tends to be passed to
all the other words in the block.
A shortcoming of a feedback (4) is that there are only 32 diﬀerent patterns may
occur. However, the most signiﬁcant bits of bj gather the information of all the
lower bits by multiplying cj , so a change of one bit in bj tends to be reﬂected in the
choice of an element in the array add table, so having good bit-diﬀusion property.
The ﬁnal operation of wordwise PEF is “rotation” or “shift”. Using pj , obtain
pseudorandom integer between 16 and 23 by the following bit-operation
(5) sj ← ((pj >> (32− 4))|0x10)&0x17,
where 0x denotes that the following number is hexadecimal. Then, the “rotation”
operation
bj = ((∼ bj) << (32− sj))|(bj >> sj);
is computed. This is rotate to the right by s bits, but the rotated s bits are reversed.
The unary operator ∼ means the bit reverse.
The “shift” operation is
(6) bj ← bj ⊕ ((∼ bj) >> sj).
Since sj is not less than 16 and a word is 32-bit, the inverse of this operation is
itself.
The “rotate” is chosen for empr and emer, and the “shift” is chosen for emps and
emes.
The above operations (i.e. the operations stated in this subsection) are applied
for j = 0, 1, . . . , t− 1 in this order. This is the description of four wordwise PEFs.
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5.4. Inter-word PEFs. Wordwize PEFs are mainly to mix the information of
each word, except for the operation involving jump, which passes (only) 5-bit of
information to another word.
Inter-word PEFs ma, mem, ome, eme are designed to pass more information of
each word to the other words.
First we describe ma. Let j = 0. Put k := (j− jump) mod t. Then, we apply the
Feistel-network-type operation
bj ← bj + (bk × pj).
Compute a pseudorandom integer sj by (5), and apply the “shift” operation (6).
Iterate this for j = 0, 1, . . . , t − 1, in this order. This describes the PEF ma. The
other three PEFs are as follows.
Let j = 0. Put k := (j − jump) mod t. Generate a pseudorandom integer s
between 0 and t− 1 such that s 
= j, by
(7)
s ← pj >> (32− log2(t));
if s = j then s ← ((s− 1) mod t).
Then, in the case of mem, apply the operation
bj ← (bj ⊕ (bk × bs))− pj
bj ← bj ⊕ (bj >> 16).
In the case of ome or eme, apply
bj ← (bj ⊕ (bk × (bspj))
bj ← bj ⊕ (bj >> c),
where  =bitwise-OR and c = 16 for ome and  = ⊕ and c = 17 for eme. Iterate
this for j = 0, 1, . . . , t−1, in this order. This completes the description of inter-word
PEFs.
5.5. crypt vert rotate. This PEF is to cut oﬀ the incidence relation among bits
in each word. Put k := 2 ∗ (p0 + pt−1) + 1 (modulo 232). Put
jump odd := (jump− 1)|1,
which is the largest odd integer not exceeding jump. We consider B to be t × 32
matrix with components 0-1, and permute each row vector of B selected by the bit
mask k (i.e., if n-th bit of k is 1, then the n-th row is selected). The permutation
of a row vector is rotation with lag jump odd. Namely, a t-dimensional row vector
t(x0, x1, . . . , xt−1) is mapped to t(x−o, x1−o, . . . xt−1−o), where o = jump odd and
the subscripts are considered modulo t. The jump odd is forced to be odd, since it
is faster to compute a cyclic permutation.
5.6. Security of Fubuki. Heuristically, one round of Fubuki has much better bit-
diﬀusion property than one round of AES. Each of steps in one round in AES has
some corresponding steps in Fubuki: ByteSub and ShiftRow in AES are replaced by
wordwise PEFs (multiplication plus feedback from right-to-left (4)), MixColumn is
included in inter-word PEFs and AddRoundKey appears in every PEFs where the
parameters pi are added, exor-ed, or subtracted. The 19937 bits of internal state
of MT seems to make time-memory-trade-oﬀ attacks infeasible. Although, we have
to say that we need to study more on the security, such as diﬀerence propagation
property. Experimental results are shown in §6.2 and Appendix B.
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algorithm initial encrypt decrypt
PowerPC crypt-mt 256601 29 30
1.33GHz fubuki 414029 204 407
rijndael-alg-fst 2793 41 38
rijndael-alg-ref 33117 1068 1063
PentiumM crypt-mt 279123 20 19
1.4GHz fubuki 489662 133 256
rijndael-alg-fst 3192 40 41
rijndael-alg-ref 85253 916 916
Table 1. execution time (number of cycles per byte)
∆fubuki,1 ∆rijndael,1
00100010111011011111001100110011
11101111001111111100110100011100
00101101111110010000000100100010
10100001000101110110011111100101
00111110000000000000000000000000
00000000000000000000000001010011
00000000000000001111000100000000
00000000010100000000000000000000
Table 2. Diﬀerential of one-round Fubuki and two-round AES
6. Comparison with AES
6.1. Speed and memory. Table 1 lists the approximate number of CPU cycles
consumed to (1) setup keys, (2) encrypt one byte, (3) decrypt one byte, for four
stream ciphers CryptMT, Fubuki, optimized AES (rijndael-alg-fst.c) and reference
AES (rijndael-alg-ref.c) [1]. Rough estimate of the size of the working area is 2.5K
bytes, 3K bytes, 10.5K bytes, and 1.4K bytes, respectively.
6.2. Bit-diﬀusion. Let E0 : B → B be one round of Fubuki encryption, with
both the key and the initial value are 128 bits of zeroes. To grasp the bit-diﬀusion
property of E0, we compute
∆fubuki,i := E0(i)⊕ E0(0),
where i is a 128-bit vector with all zero components except for the i-th bit being
1. For comparison, we compute
∆rijndael,i := A0(i)⊕A0(0),
where A0 is the 2-round AES with randomly chosen key.
The result for i = 1 is described in Table 2. The bit patterns suggest that one
round of Fubuki seems to have quicker bit-diﬀusion property than two rounds of
rijndael. Similar results are observed for all 1 ≤ i ≤ 128.
Appendix A. Period of CryptMT
In this appendix, we shall prove the following.
Theorem A.1. The period of the output sequence of CryptMT is P := 219937−1.
Moreover, every bit of the sequence has period P .
This may seem to be obvious, but we think not so.
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Let x0,x1,x2, . . . be the output of MT. MT has the following 623-dimensional
equidistribution property.
Lemma A.2. Any bit pattern of (32 × 623) bits occurs the same (actually two)
times in the form of the tuple
(xi,xi+1, . . . ,xi+622)
when we move i = 0, 1, . . . , P−1. There is an exception: the all-zero pattern occurs
only once.
In the following proof, we use only this property and the fact that P is a prime.
Let us deﬁne x′i to be xi with the least signiﬁcant bit set to 1. We denote by
Z/232 the residue ring modulo 232 identiﬁed with 32-bit integers, and by (Z/232)×
its multiplicative group, identiﬁed with 32-bit odd integers. In the following, mul-
tiplication of 32-bit integers are taken in this group, i.e. modulo 232.
Let us deﬁne 32-bit word sequence ai by
ai+1 = aix′i, (a0 =some odd integer).
The output sequence of CryptMT is the sequence of the most signiﬁcant 8 bits of
ai.
Corollary A.3. Any element of ((Z/232)×)623 occurs the same times in the form
of the tuple (x′i,x
′
i+1, . . . ,x
′
i+622) when we move i = 0, 1, . . . , P − 1, except for
(1, 1, . . . , 1) which occurs once less often.
Any element of (Z/232)× occurs same times in the form of xi for i = 0, 1, . . . , P−
1.
Corollary A.4.
P−1∏
i=0
x′i = 1.
Proof. By cancellation of x and x−1, for any abelian group G we have∏
x∈G
x =
∏
x2=1
x.
In the case of G = (Z/232)×, the elements of order two are exactly x = 1,−1, 232−1−
1, 232−1 + 1, and their product is 1. The conclusion is deduced from the above
corollary. 
Lemma A.5. The period of ai divides P .
Proof. This is because
ai+P = (
P−1∏
i=0
xi)ai,
which is ai by the above corollary. 
Since P is a (Mersenne) prime, in particular, every bit of ai has period 1 or P.
Thus, to show the theorem, we only need to show that its period is not 1.
Lemma A.6. Deﬁne a function
ϕ : ((Z/232)×)624 → ((Z/232)×)623
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by
(b0, . . . , b623) → (b1/b0, b2/b1, . . . , b623/b622).
Deﬁne sets A and X by
A := {(ai, ai+1, . . . , ai+623)|i = 0, 1, 2, . . .},
X := {(xi, xi+1, . . . , xi+622)|i = 0, 1, 2, . . .}.
Then, the restriction ϕ|A : A → X is surjective.
Proof. Because (ai, ai+1, . . . , ai+623) is mapped to (xi, xi+1, . . . , xi+622). 
Now we prove the theorem. Suppose that -th bit of ai has period 1. Then, each
ai is contained in the subset of (Z/232)× whose -th bit coincides with that of ai.
There are 230 such odd integers, so we have
#(A) ≤ 230×624.
On the other hand, by Corollary A.3, we have
#(X) = 231×623,
which is larger than #(A), contradicting to the existence of a surjection A → X.
This shows that -th bit has period > 1, but it divides the prime P , hence = P .
Remark A.7. The lemma A.6 claims that #(A) ≥ 231×623, where A ⊂ ((Z/231)×)624.
This suggests that ai would be fairy well equi-distributed in a high-dimensional
cube, and so would the output of CryptMT.
Remark A.8. The above remark is valid for
(1) any mother generator with high-dimensional equidistribution property, and
(2) any binary operation ◦
a′ := a ◦ x
which is invertible, i.e. x → a ◦ x is bijective. In our case, ◦ is the multipli-
cation.
Appendix B. Experimental comparison of Fubuki and AES
We tested the bit-diﬀusion property of Fubuki and AES with small number of
rounds, as follows. This is a typical diﬀerential attack to block ciphers.
Let E : B → B be an encryption function. Let B′ ⊂ B. We uniformly randomly
generate B ∈ B′, and compute the diﬀerence ∆E(B) := E(B ⊕ 1) ⊕ E(B) (1 is
a block whose bits are all zero except for the ﬁrst bit). The resulting 128 bits = 4
words are considered to be 4×4 matrix of 8-bit integers. Then the (i, j)-component
∆Eij(B) of ∆E(B) is a random variable with values in 0, 1, . . . , 255, which should
ideally be uniform.
We generate B randomly N times. Then we count the number of occurrence of
an integer k (0 ≤ k ≤ 255) as ∆Eij(B), denoted by FEij (N)[k] (F for frequency).
If FEij (N)[k] = 0 then k did not appear in the (i, j) component of ∆
E(B) for N
times. Ideally the expectation of FEij (N)[k] should be N/256. We take the following
normalization:
fEij (N)[k] := F
E
ij (N)[k]× 256/N.
We compute these statistics, and lists the minimum and the maximum of fEij (N)[k]
for k = 0, . . . , 255.
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3-round AES
0.73700, 1.20090 0.68740, 1.21830 0.78480, 1.26710 0.73810, 1.24930
0.66180, 1.23490 0.78750, 1.28410 0.75200, 1.24890 0.73110, 1.20510
0.77420, 1.28260 0.74730, 1.23530 0.73150, 1.21340 0.67320, 1.21810
0.75130, 1.23510 0.73240, 1.19540 0.68640, 1.21500 0.77710, 1.29130
4-round AES
0.97610, 1.02900 0.97460, 1.02790 0.97670, 1.02280 0.96700, 1.02820
0.96750, 1.03410 0.96760, 1.02740 0.97730, 1.03680 0.97410, 1.02370
0.97660, 1.02330 0.97060, 1.03260 0.97070, 1.02670 0.96830, 1.03220
0.97290, 1.03590 0.96650, 1.03000 0.97220, 1.02920 0.97600, 1.02280
1-round Fubuki
0.51770, 1.66800 0.69160, 1.54620 0.24140, 3.50450 0.38440, 1.59600
0.01450, 4.30050 0.88450, 1.10840 0.43290, 1.44460 0.43300, 2.35560
0.04200, 1.96300 0.00000, 3.98790 0.00000, 3.14730 0.12590, 2.16670
0.97650, 1.02430 0.97670, 1.02490 0.97740, 1.02910 0.97120, 1.03330
2-round Fubuki
0.97480, 1.02720 0.97790, 1.02440 0.97250, 1.02920 0.97340, 1.02710
0.97000, 1.03010 0.96790, 1.02700 0.97450, 1.02540 0.97270, 1.02880
0.97600, 1.02530 0.97650, 1.03050 0.97360, 1.02970 0.96860, 1.03170
0.97480, 1.02900 0.96770, 1.02820 0.96690, 1.02770 0.97260, 1.03390
Table 3. Diﬀerentials of 3-round AES, 4-round AES, 1-round
Fubuki and 2-round Fubuki. Lists of the normalized frequency
(minimum, maximum) for N = 2, 560, 000 times sampling
.
Table 3 shows the result of the tests. We selected 3-round AES, 4-round AES, 1-
round Fubuki and 2-round Fubuki as ciphers. We choose B′ to be the blocks whose
ﬁrst word is arbitrary and the rest three words are zero. We take N = 2560000 such
sample blocks, and compute the diﬀerence caused by adding 1 as above. The table
lists the minimum and and the maximum normalized frequencies. For example, the
ﬁrst pair (0.73700, 1.20090) in the table of 3-round AES shows that there is some
k, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . , 255, for which (1, 1)-coordinate byte of the block-diﬀerence takes
value k for 0.73700 × 2560000/256 times. This is the least frequency among 256
possible values as for the (1,1)-coordinate.
The table shows that 3-round AES is still weak, since for 4-round AES, the
frequencies are much diﬀerent. Although not listed, 2-round AES has many (0,
256). For 1-round Fubuki, there are several zeroes as minimum-frequencies. This
implies that there are some impossible 8-bit patterns for that coordinate. Such bias
seems to be eliminated in 2-round Fubuki.
Although the result is omitted, experimental results for larger rounds are similar
to that for 4-round AES (and 2-round Fubuki).
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